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Abstract
One can consider the concept of market neutrality for hedge funds as having breadth and depth:
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the completeness of the neutrality of the fund to market risks. We focus on market neutral-
ity depth, and propose Þve diﬀerent neutrality concepts. Mean neutrality nests the standard
correlation-based deÞnition of neutrality. Variance neutrality, Value-at-Risk neutrality and
tail neutrality all relate to the neutrality of the risk of the hedge fund to market risks. Finally,
complete neutrality corresponds to independence of the fund to market risks. We suggest sta-
tistical tests for each neutrality concept, and apply the tests to a combined database of monthly
market neutral hedge fund returns from the HFR and TASS hedge fund databases. We Þnd that
around one-quarter of these funds exhibit some signiÞcant exposure to market risk.
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1 Introduction
The hedge fund industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors of the economy. The value of assets
under the management of hedge funds has grown from $50 billion in 1990 to around $1 trillion
in 20041. In addition to the impressive returns observed on some hedge funds recently, the low
correlation between hedge fund returns and market returns is an oft-cited favorable characteristic
of hedge funds generally, see Brown, et al. (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Agarwal and Naik
(2002). Indeed, the term hedge fund was coined with reference to the goal of the Þrst such
funds, which was to invest in under-valued securities using the proceeds from short-sales of related
securities, thereby creating a market neutral strategy, see Caldwell (1995).
Hedge funds are often classiÞed according to their self-described investment strategies or styles,
and the equity market neutral strategy is one of the largest such categories, representing about
20% of funds under the management of hedge funds according to Fung and Hsieh (1999). But
despite their size, what exactly is meant by the moniker market neutral can be hard to pin down.
Most deÞnitions2 of an equity market neutral strategy include phrases like neutralize market risk(s)
by combining long and short positions in related securities, with limited detail on how neutrality
should be measured and what risks should be considered market risks. Clarity and precision in
the use of these terms would be beneÞcial. Indeed, the case of Weyerhaeuser vs. Geewax Terker
& Company, which featured several prominent Þnance academics as expert witnesses, centered on
whether Geewax Terker had truly followed a market neutral strategy3.
The most commonly used measure of neutrality is based on correlation or beta: a fund may be
said to be market neutral if it generates returns that are uncorrelated with the returns on some
market index, or a collection of market risk factors. Several studies, see Fung and Hsieh (2001),
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2002), have observed the nonlinear relation
between hedge fund returns and market returns and proposed more sophisticated methods for
modeling the expected returns on hedge funds: Fung and Hsieh (2001) suggest using payoﬀs from
lookback straddle options on the market to approximate the pay-oﬀ structure of hedge funds.
1Source: The Economist, June 10, 2004.
2See Hedge Fund Researchs Strategy DeÞnitions, Nicholas (2000) and Beliossi (2002) for example.
3Sources: The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1992, and Pension & Investments, March 30, 1992. Geewax Terker
eventually settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pay Weyerhaeuser $8 million, almost as much as Weyerhaeuser had
originally given Geewax Terker to manage.
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Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2002) similarly suggest using piece-wise linear
models for the hedge fund returns as a function of the market return.
We consider the concept of neutrality more generally than that implied by the use of correlations
or betas. We suggest that one can consider the concept of market neutrality as having breadth
and depth. The breadth of the neutrality of a hedge fund refers to the number of sources
of market risk, such as equity market index risk, exchange rate risks and interest rate risks,
etc., to which the returns on the hedge fund are neutral. The depth of the neutrality of a
hedge fund refers to the completeness of the neutrality of the fund to market risks. We focus
on market neutrality depth and propose Þve diﬀerent neutrality concepts: mean neutrality,
which nests the standard correlation- or beta-based deÞnition of neutrality. Variance neutrality,
Value-at-Risk neutrality and tail neutrality all relate to the neutrality of the risk of the hedge
fund returns to market returns. The Þnal concept, complete neutrality, corresponds to statistical
independence of the fund and the market returns. We suggest statistical tests for each neutrality
concept, and apply the tests to a combined database of monthly market neutral hedge fund
returns from the HFR and TASS hedge fund databases, using the S&P 500 or the MSCI World
indices to represent the market. Focusing solely on a single equity market index may be interpreted
as testing a necessary condition for neutrality to a wider set of market variables.
By presenting a battery of neutrality concepts and tests we hope to aid investors evaluation
of these funds, in a similar way to the use of the Greeks to evaluate the exposure of an option
position, see Hull (2003). The concepts and tests proposed in this paper may be used as methods
of analyzing the non-neutrality of hedge funds, rather than solely as strict tests of their neutrality.
As the neutrality of a market neutral fund is one of its selling points, we conjecture that when
comparing a collection of such funds, the risk, reward and the nature of the dependence between
each fund and the market is of interest to investors. Of course, if the investors utility function was
known, then funds could be directly ranked by expected utility, however such a case is not common
in practise.
The market neutral class of hedge funds has not received a great deal of attention in the
academic literature, though it currently represents a signiÞcant fraction of the hedge fund industry
and has been growing at a rapid rate: from 2% of the hedge fund market in the early 1990s
to around 20% of the market in the late 1990s, see Fung and Hsieh (1999) and Nicholas (2000).
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) focus on risk arbitrage hedge funds, Fung and Hsieh (2001) on trend
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following hedge funds, and Agarwal and Naik (2002) on event arbitrage, restructuring, event
driven, relative value arbitrage, convertible arbitrage and equity hedge4 funds.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we propose a number of diﬀerent neutrality
concepts relevant for hedge fund return and risk analysis, and present statistical tests of each neu-
trality concept. We pay particular attention to the types of non-neutral alternatives considered
in each test: we consider either a general non-neutral alternative, or only those non-neutral alter-
natives that are disliked by risk averse investors with some existing exposure to market risk. For
example, a risk averse investor prefers zero correlation to positive correlation, but prefers negative
correlation to zero correlation. Thus we may test zero correlation against non-zero correlation, or
only against positive correlation.
The second contribution of the paper is a detailed study of the neutrality of a combined data-
base of market neutral hedge funds from the HFR and TASS hedge fund databases over the
period April 1993 to April 2003. We use monthly data on 194 live and 23 dead market neutral
hedge funds to evaluate their neutrality against a market index, the S&P 500. We Þnd that ap-
proximately one-quarter of these funds exhibit some signiÞcant non-neutrality, at the 0.05 level.
These proportions are lower than those found for other categories of hedge funds. Thus our Þndings
suggest that many market neutral hedge funds are in fact not market neutral, but overall they
are, at least, more market neutral than other categories of hedge funds. In a series of robustness
checks we verify that our results are not overly aﬀected by our choice of market index, our use of
U.S. dollar returns, or by the last few, or Þrst few, observations on fund returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data used
in this study. In Section 3 we present deÞnitions of diﬀerent types of neutrality, tests for each
deÞnition, and the results of these tests when applied to our collection of hedge funds. In Section
4 we present robustness checks of our results. Section 5 contains some discussion of extensions of
the neutrality deÞnitions presented in Section 3, and Section 6 concludes. An Appendix contains
details on the bootstrap methods used in the paper.
4Although similar-sounding in name, the equity hedge index in the HFR database is distinct from the eq-
uity market neutral index. See https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/HFR_Strategy_DeÞnitions.pdf. Nicholas
(2000) includes some of these categories in the broad category of market neutral, and categorises the funds in our
analysis as a subset of equity market neutral funds.
4
2 Description of the data and results using correlation
Our data set consists of those funds that categorize themselves as being market neutral and an
equity market index, the S&P 500. We will focus on the S&P 500 as the market index for most
of this paper, and show in Section 4 that our results do not change greatly if we instead use other
equity market indices. The fund returns are monthly, net of management fees. Summary statistics
on the funds are presented in Table 1, and summary statistics on the number of observations
available on each of the funds are presented in Table 2. The latter of these two tables shows that
we have between 59 and 213 market neutral funds available for analysis, depending on the data
requirements of the test being considered.
[ INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE ]
When computing measures of dependence between the market and a fund we do so using all
data from the period when the fund was in the data base. The database includes both live and
dead funds5 and one may question whether the behavior of some funds in the period leading up to
their dropping out of the database distorts our results. We show in Section 4 that this is not the
case.
Before moving on to consider reÞnements of the deÞnition of market neutrality, we will Þrst
analyze the relationship between the funds and the market index using standard linear correlation.
The average correlation between the 171 hedge funds with 18 or more observations and the market
index was 0.016, and the 5th and 95th sample quantiles of the cross-sectional distribution of corre-
lation coeﬃcients was [-0.64, 0.39] indicating substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the degree of
correlation with the market portfolio.
Using a bootstrap procedure described in detail in the Appendix, which is designed to yield
tests that are robust to serial correlation, volatility clustering and return non-normality, we Þnd
that 29.2% of the funds in our sample exhibit signiÞcant correlation with the market portfolio at
the 0.05 level. This is statistic is surprisingly high: these are funds are (self-) described as market
neutral, possibly to more factors than our single market index, and yet almost one-third of them
have signiÞcant correlations with the market. If we instead focus our test only on deviations from
5As Agarwal, et al. (2003) point out, these funds are misnomered, since funds may drop out of the database
for numerous reasons: liquidation (death), mergers, or simply a withdrawal from reporting to the database while
continuing to operate.
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zero correlation to positive correlation with the market, which is the sign of correlation a risk averse
investor seeks to avoid, then we Þnd 28.0% of funds with signiÞcant positive correlation. That is,
over a quarter of the market neutral funds in our sample exhibit signiÞcant positive correlation
with the market.
Under a joint null hypothesis that all funds in our sample are correlation neutral we would
expect 5% of funds to be rejected. To determine whether the proportion of rejections we observe
are signiÞcantly diﬀerent from what we expect under the null hypothesis we consider two methods
of obtaining a critical value. The Þrst is based on the unrealistic assumption that the test statistics
for each fund are independent. In this case the critical value can be obtained from the Binomial
distribution, and it is 7.74% in this case. A bootstrap method for obtaining a critical value that
allows for dependence between the test statistics is discussed in the Appendix, and yields a critical
value of 18.75%, much higher than that obtained assuming independence, but still less than the
observed proportion of rejections. Thus we conclude that we have signiÞcant evidence against
correlation neutrality for this collection of funds as a whole.
Correlation neutrality is just one of many types of neutrality that may be of interest to a risk
averse investor. An investor with quadratic utility, or one facing returns that are multivariate
normally distributed, will only require linear correlation as the measure of dependence, and so
this standard concept of market neutrality would suﬃce. However neither quadratic utility nor
multivariate normality is an empirically reasonable assumption, particularly for hedge fund returns,
and so we now consider alternative types of market neutrality.
3 DeÞnitions and tests of versions of market neutrality
In this section we consider reÞnements of the concept of market neutrality, using the preferences of
a generic risk averse investor to motivate each concept and to determine the alternative hypotheses
to consider. Depending on the preferences of the investor, one or more of the following deÞnitions,
or perhaps some neutrality index formed by some combination of these, may be of interest. We
will start with the simplest generalization of correlation neutrality, and proceed through to the
strictest form of neutrality: that of independence between the fund return and the market return.
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3.1 Mean neutrality
The simplest neutrality concept, and the one that nests the standard correlation neutral concept,
is that of mean neutrality. This is deÞned as the expected return on the fund being independent
of the return on the market:
E [rit|rmt] = E [rit] ∀ rmt (1)
or E [rit|Ft−1, rmt] = E [rit|Ft−1] ∀ rmt (2)
and corresponds to the statement that the market return does not Granger-cause the fund return
in mean. The second of the above conditions allows us to consider mean neutrality conditional on
some other information, Ft−1. We will focus primarily on the Þrst of the above two conditions due
to the data limitations we face.
Equation (1) is a stricter statement than correlation neutrality, as it rules out any function, not
just a linear function, of the market return being useful for explaining fund returns. To test mean
neutrality we could employ a number of methods. The most general would employ nonparametric
regression to estimate µi (rmt) = E [rit|rmt]:
rit = µi (rmt) + eit
and then test that µi is equal to a constant. A simple alternative would be to employ a Taylor
series approximation6 ,7 to the conditional mean function:
rit = β0 + β1rmt + β2r
2
mt + ...+ eit
To capture the possibility that hedge funds exhibit diﬀerent dependence on the market during
market downturns than market upturns, as in Longin and Solnik (2001) or Ang and Chen (2002)
for example, we consider a polynomial approximation that diﬀers for positive versus negative market
6Numerous authors have, in various contexts, proposed using a polynomial in the market return to explain asset
returns, see Bansal, et al. (1993), Chapman (1997), Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar (2002), amongst others.
7Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2002) both use piece-wise linear regressions rather than
polynomials in their approximation of the conditional mean function. Under certain conditions on how the models
expand as the sample size increases both methods can be considered nonparametric models for the conditional mean,
see Andrews (1991) or Chen and Shen (1998). The use of a piece-wise linear speciÞcation with estimated kink points
may lead to parameter identiÞcation problems when testing, however.
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returns:
rit = β0 + β1rmtδt + β2r
2
mtδt + ... (3)
+γ1rmt (1− δt) + γ2r2mt (1− δt) + ...+ eit
where δt =
 1 rmt ≤ 00 rmt > 0
and then test
H0 : βi = γi = 0 for all i > 0 (4)
vs. Ha : βi 6= 0 or γi 6= 0 for at least one i > 0
via a standard χ2 test. We estimated a simple second-order polynomial version of the model in
equation (3) on the 150 funds with at least 24 observations, and found that for 23.3% of funds we
could reject the null hypothesis of mean neutrality at the 0.05 level.
The deÞnition above, however, ignores the fact that there are certain types of relations between
the expected return on a fund and the market return that a risk averse investor would desire,
and others that he/she would dislike. For example, a risk averse investor would prefer a negative
relation between the fund and the market when the market return is negative, and a positive
relation when the market return is positive, to zero correlation in both states. Thus it may not
be mean neutrality that investors truly seek, or that market neutral hedge funds truly seek to
provide, but rather a restricted type of dependence between the fund and the market. Below we
derive a test of mean neutrality which tests only for violations of mean neutrality that are disliked
by risk averse investors.
Consider the following reÞnement of mean neutrality, which we will call mean neutrality on
the downside. This form of neutrality imposes that the expected return on the fund is neutral or
negatively related to the market the market return is negative. That is:
∂µi (rmt)
∂rmt
≤ 0 for all rmt ≤ 0 (5)
where µi (rmt) ≡ E [rit|rmt]. This version of neutrality ignores the relation between the fund and
the market when the market return is positive, focusing solely on the ability of the fund to provide
diversiÞcation beneÞts when the market return is negative. If we use the second-order polynomial
version of equation (3) to approximate the conditional mean function, then
∂µi (rmt)
∂rmt
= β1 + 2β2rmt for rmt ≤ 0
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The Þrst derivative of µi is negative for all values of rmt ≤ 0 if and only if β1 ≤ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. Thus
a test of mean neutrality on the downside may be obtained by testing the following hypothesis:
H0 : β1 ≤ 0 ∩ β2 ≥ 0 (6)
vs. Ha : β1 > 0 ∪ β2 < 0
As a test statistic we use max [β1,−β2], and we compare the observed value of this statistic with
the 95th quantile of the bootstrap distribution of this test statistic. We were able to reject mean
neutrality on the downside for only 0.7% of funds at the 0.05 level. Thus while we observe
signiÞcant evidence against mean neutrality for these funds, we see no such evidence when restricting
attention to alternatives that risk averse investors dislike8.
One concern about the above regressions and the subsequent tests on functions of the estimated
parameters regards omitted variables bias. Consider an example where a single factor, diﬀerent
from the market portfolio, drives a given funds returns. If this factor is positively correlated with
the market, then with suﬃcient data the above method will reject the null hypothesis that the fund
is market neutral even though the factor driving returns is not the market portfolio. However, if
the factor is correlated with the market then part of its risk is market risk and part is non-market
risk, and so exposure to this factor does indeed involve some exposure to market risk. Thus the
conclusion that this hypothetical fund is not market neutral seems reasonable. If one wanted to
test market neutrality controlling for fund exposure to some other sources of risk, then this could
be done by simply including the returns on the other factors in the above regression as control
variables.
3.2 Variance neutrality
Another form of neutrality that one might expect from a market neutral fund is that the risk of
the fund is neutral to market risk. In particular, we might expect that the risk of the fund, while
not constant, does not increase at the same time as the risk of the market index. In this section
8 In a previous version of this paper we used a second-order polynomial that did not allow the parameters to diﬀer
according to the sign of the market return. The proportion of funds that failed the general test of mean neutrality
using this model was qualitatively similar to the Þgure reported here, but the proportion of funds that failed the test
of mean neutrality on the downside was much higher: around 25%. This indicates the importance of allowing the
dependence between funds and the market to depend on the sign of the market return.
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we consider risk as measured by variance, and in the next section we consider risk as measured by
Value-at-Risk. To our knowledge this paper is the Þrst to consider the market neutrality of the risk
of a hedge fund.
In the tests below we will control for mean non-neutrality before testing variance, VaR, or tail
neutrality. This fact, combined with the limited data available, makes it unsurprising that we have
only limited power in these tests. Nevertheless, these tests provide us with an alternative view on
the relationship between a fund and the market and so may oﬀer information not available in more
standard mean-based tests.
Risk averse investors can be shown to have preferences over the dependence between the variance
of the fund and the market return. Non-increasing absolute risk aversion, a property suggested by
Arrow (1971) as being desirable in a utility function, leads to a preference for positive skewness
in the distribution of portfolio returns. Kimball (1993) suggested further that reasonable utility
functions should exhibit decreasing absolute prudence, which can be shown to imply an aversion to
kurtosis in the distribution of portfolio returns9. Together these imply that risk averse investors
prefer
Corr
h
(rit − µi)2 , rmt − µm
i
≥ 0, and
Corr
h
(rit − µi)2 , (rmt − µm)2
i
≤ 0
so that the skewness of a portfolio of the fund and the market is larger and the kurtosis of the
portfolio is smaller. With this motivation, we deÞne variance neutrality, controlling for mean
non-neutrality, as
V [rit − µi (rmt) |rmt] = V [rit − µi (rmt)] (7)
or V [rit − µi (rmt) |Ft−1, rmt] = V [rit − µi (rmt) |Ft−1] (8)
In a similar manner to the previous section, we can obtain a test by approximating the true
conditional variance function, σ2i (rmt), by a Taylor series polynomial:
9Related papers on investor preferences over higher-order moments include Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Harvey
and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar (2002), amongst many others.
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rit = µi (rmt) + eit (9)
eit = σi (rmt) εit, εit ∼ (0, 1) (10)
µi (rmt) = β0 + β1rmtδt + β2r
2
mtδt (11)
+γ1rmt (1− δt) + γ2r2mt (1− δt) + eit
σ2i (rmt) = α0 + α1rmtδt + α2r
2
mtδt (12)
+α3 (1− δt) rmt + α4r2mt (1− δt) , or
σ2i (rmt, eit−1) = α0 + α1rmtδt + α2r
2
mtδt (13)
+α3 (1− δt) rmt + α4r2mt (1− δt) + α5e2it−1
where δt =
 1 rmt ≤ 00 rmt > 0 (14)
where the latter conditional variance speciÞcation is designed to control for an ARCH(1) eﬀect in
the fund return. To test variance neutrality we would then test
H0 : αi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (15)
vs. Ha : αi 6= 0 for some i
We conducted this test on the 150 funds with more than 24 observations, with the ARCH(1)
term as a control, and were able to reject the null at the 0.05 level for only 6.0% of funds. Thus
most of these funds appear to be variance neutral to the market portfolio.
We can also consider variance neutrality on the downside, where we use the preferences of a
risk averse investor to determine the desired sign of the Þrst derivative of the conditional variance
function when the market return is negative. The above preferences of a risk averse investor imply
a preference for:
∂σ2i (rmt)
∂rmt
≥ 0 for all rmt ≤ 0 (16)
Using the above speciÞcation for the conditional variance, we then obtain
∂σ2i (rmt)
∂rmt
= α1 + 2α2rmt ≥ 0 for rmt ≤ 0
and so the relevant hypotheses are:
H0 : α1 ≥ 0 ∩ α2 ≤ 0 (17)
vs. Ha : α1 < 0 ∪ α2 > 0
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We use max [−α1, α2] as the test statistic, and compare the observed value of this statistic with
the 95th quantile of its bootstrap distribution. We found signiÞcant violations of variance neutrality
on the downside for 4.0% of funds when including an ARCH(1) term in the variance speciÞcation.
Overall, after controlling for violations of mean neutrality, we Þnd no statistical evidence of
violations of variance neutrality. This is in contrast with the widely-known fact that many hedge
funds take volatility bets, that is, they take positions that pay oﬀ when market volatility is high,
regardless of the direction of the movement. Thus it may be that our failure to Þnd evidence against
variance neutrality is due to a lack of data, and thus limited test power.
3.3 Value-at-Risk neutrality
The second risk-related neutrality concept we propose is that of Value-at-Risk neutrality, or VaR
neutrality. Given that the VaR of an asset is simply a quantile of its distribution of returns10, this
could also be called quantile neutrality. If we set the quantile to be 0.5, we would have a test
of median neutrality, though we do not pursue that here. Quantile neutrality is a special case
of complete neutrality, discussed below, which implies that all quantiles of the fund are neutral to
the market, but diﬀers from the previous two neutrality concepts in that it focuses on quantiles
rather than moments. A VaR neutral portfolio is one with a VaR that is unaﬀected by the market
portfolio return. That is:
V aR (rit|rmt) = V aR (rit) (18)
or V aR (rit|rmt,Ft−1) = V aR (rit|Ft−1) (19)
Violations of mean neutrality or variance neutrality will generally lead to violations of VaR
neutrality, which leads us to consider conditional VaR neutrality11:
V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¯¯¯¯
rmt
¶
= V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¶
(20)
where we consider only the VaR of the standardized returns and not the returns themselves. Gupta
and Liang (2003) have used VaR to examine the risk in hedge funds from a regulatory perspective.
10Formally, the Value-at-Risk of an asset is obtained from the following equality: Pr [rt ≤ V aRt|Ft−1] = α, where
α usually equals 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01.
11Note that we use the term conditional VaR to refer to the quantile of a conditional distribution.Other
authors have used this term to describe the expected return conditioning on the VaR being breached, that is,
E [rit|rit ≤ V aR (rit)], a quantity otherwise known as expected shortfall or tail conditional loss.
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Though hedge fund returns are generally not normally or elliptically distributed, see Gupta and
Liang (2003) for example, it is interesting to note that if the market and fund returns were jointly
elliptically distributed then the portfolio VaR would be an aﬃne function of the portfolio variance,
and VaR neutrality would then follow directly from mean and variance neutrality. Under normality,
conditional VaR neutrality would always hold, even if mean and variance neutrality did not, but
for other elliptical distributions this need not be the case. Embrechts, et al. (2001) provide further
discussion on VaR for portfolios, and see Artzner, et al. (1999) for a criticism of VaR as a measure
of risk.
There are a number of ways that one might test the null hypothesis
H0 : V aR (rit|rmt) = V aR (rit) ∀ rmt (21)
vs. Ha : V aR (rit|rmt) 6= V aR (rit) for some rmt
or
H0 : V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¯¯¯¯
rmt
¶
= V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¶
∀ rmt (22)
vs. Ha : V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¯¯¯¯
rmt
¶
6= V aR
µ
rit − µi (rmt)
σi (rmt)
¶
for some rmt
With suﬃcient data one could use quantile regression, see Koenker and Bassett (1978), to test
for the inßuence of the market return on a quantile of the fund return distribution in a similar way
to our tests for mean and variance neutrality. However hedge fund return histories are notoriously
short and the quantiles of interest are in the tail, so it is likely that data shortages will be a problem.
A simple alternative way of testing a necessary condition for VaR neutrality is via a test of
Christoﬀersen (1998). This test examines whether the probability of one variable exceeding its
VaR is aﬀected by another variable exceeding or not exceeding its VaR. SpeciÞcally, we test:
H0 : Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt ≤[V aR (εmt)
i
= Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt > [V aR (εmt)
i
(23)
vs. Ha : Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt ≤[V aR (εmt)
i
6= Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt > [V aR (εmt)
i
where εit ≡ (rit − µi (rmt)) /σi (rmt) and εmt ≡ (rmt − µmt) /σmt. For the fund we again use a
second-order polynomial for the conditional mean, and a second-order polynomial for the condi-
tional variance with an ARCH(1) term. For the market we use a simple AR(1)-ARCH(1) model.
[V aR (εit) and [V aR (εmt) are estimated by the empirical quantiles of εit and εmt.
Due to the data-intensive nature of studies of VaR, we only considered funds that had at least
66 months of observations available, which left us with 59 funds, and we tested the 10% VaR rather
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than the more common 1% or 5% VaR. We conducted the conditional VaR neutrality test on these
funds and found evidence against VaR neutrality for none of the funds at the 0.05 level. Thus we
have no evidence against VaR neutrality for these funds, having controlled for mean and variance
non-neutrality.
We can also consider a downside version of this test, which focusses speciÞcally on testing
whether the probability of the fund breaching its VaR is greater given that the market return has
breached its VaR.
H0 : Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt ≤[V aR (εmt)
i
≤ Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
i
(24)
vs. Ha : Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
¯¯¯
εmt ≤[V aR (εmt)
i
> Pr
h
εit ≤[V aR (εit)
i
This version of VaR neutrality uses the fact that a risk averse investor would be averse to a fund
that has a higher probability of a VaR exceedance given that the market has exceeded its VaR,
and would have a preference for the opposite. Conducting this test on the funds we again Þnd that
none of these funds are rejected at the 0.05 level, and so conclude that we have no evidence against
the downside VaR neutrality of these funds.
3.4 Tail neutrality
Now we consider the concept of neutrality during extreme events, or tail neutrality. Intuitively
this can be thought of as an extension of VaR neutrality to the extreme tail: a market neutral fund
should be have a probability of extreme events that is unaﬀected by the market return. The formal
deÞnition of tail neutrality that we will use is:
τL ≡ lim
q→0Pr [Fi (ri) < q|Fm (rm) < q] = limq→0Pr [Fi (ri) < q] = 0 (25)
where ri|Ωt−1 ∼ Fi and rm|Ωt−1 ∼ Fm. In words, our deÞnition imposes that the probability of
an extremely low return on the fund is not aﬀected by conditioning on the fact that an extremely
low return on the market is observed. The variable τL is known as the coeﬃcient of lower tail
dependence, see Joe (1997) for example. If the fund return and the market return have zero lower
tail dependence then the probability of an extreme negative return on the fund is unaﬀected by
an extreme negative return on the market portfolio, and limits to zero as we consider more and
more extreme returns. The alternative to tail neutrality is tail dependence, when τL > 0. If the
tail dependence coeﬃcient is positive then there is a non-zero chance that both the fund and the
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market will simultaneously experience an extremely low return. It is intuitively clear that risk
averse investors would prefer tail neutrality to positive tail dependence: a higher probability of a
joint crash increases the probability of a large negative return on a portfolio of these two assets.
That is, positive lower tail dependence will generally lead to a fatter left tail.
A number of recent studies have proposed methods for detecting dependence in the tails of
joint distributions. Longin and Solnik (2001) propose specifying a speciÞc copula for the joint tails,
Claytons copula in Nelsen (1999), and then testing that the parameter of this copula is such that
no tail dependence is present. Bae, et al. (2003) model the probability of the joint occurrence of
large returns across assets using parametric multinomial logistic regression. We employ the method
of Quintos (2003), who proposes a nonparametric approach using extreme value theory, to derive
a statistic to test for tail dependence12. Due to the heavy data requirements of tail analyses we
restricted our sample to the 28 funds in our sample with at least 100 observations. Of these, 9 had
enough observations in the joint tail to complete the test, and only one of these 9 funds rejected the
null of no tail dependence at the 0.05 level13. Thus we conclude that no evidence of violations of tail
neutrality is present for the funds in our database. This conclusion, however, may be overturned
in the future when more data becomes available and our estimates of tail behavior become more
precise.
It should be noted that the heavy data requirements of the VaR neutrality and tail neutrality
tests introduce the possibility that survivorship bias aﬀects our results. It may be that the funds
that survive for a minimum of 66 or 100 months are those that live up to the name market
neutral. This may be because surviving funds are those that have maintained a good return
regardless of the market (which is a deÞnition of market neutrality) or because investors desire
market neutral funds that are truly market neutral and so these funds remain alive. In either of
these scenarios, surviving funds would be more likely to pass VaR and tail neutrality tests, and thus
the low proportion of rejections of VaR neutrality and tail neutrality would not be representative
of the VaR and tail neutrality of market neutral funds with a shorter histories. We investigate
fund longevity and market neutrality further in Section 4.
12We also implemented the method of Longin and Solnik (2001) on our hedge funds. While this method is quite
diﬀerent in implementation from the method of Quintos (2003), we drew similar conclusions using both methods.
13We used the asymptotic theory provided by Quintos (2003) rather than the bootstrap for this test.
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3.5 Complete neutrality
Complete neutrality is the strictest form of neutrality, and requires that the distribution of fund
returns is completely independent of the market return. The formal deÞnition is:
ri|rm =d ri (26)
where  =d  indicates equality in distribution. If we let rit ∼ Fi and rmt ∼ Fm, and (rit, rmt) ∼ F ,
this implies that
f (rit, rmt) = fi (rit) · fm (rmt) (27)
whereas in general the joint distribution of the fund return and the market return is written as
f (rit, rmt) = fi (rit) · fm (rmt) · c (Fi (rit) , Fm (rmt)) (28)
where c is the copula density14 or dependence function of the fund and the market returns.
Under complete neutrality the assets copula is the independence copula, denoted cI , which takes
the value 1 everywhere. We can use the preferences of a risk averse investor to derive a ranking of
copulas between the fund and the market using a result of Epstein and Tanny (1980).
A general alternative to complete neutrality is a dependence function, C∗, that diﬀers from CI
by a correlation-increasing transformation (CIT) of Epstein and Tanny (1980). A CIT is the
dependence equivalent of the better-known mean-preserving spread of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970). A CIT shifts some probability mass towards realizations where both variables are large
or small and away from realizations where one is large and the other is small in such a way
that the marginal distributions of the variables are preserved. From Epstein and Tanny (1980) we
know that:
CI (u, v) ≤ C∗ (u, v) ∀ (u, v) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] (29)
and we say that C∗ is more concordant15 than CI , or simply that CI ≤ C∗. This ordering is a
multivariate Þrst-order stochastic dominance ordering.
14The copula cdf is denoted with an upper case C while the copula density is denoted with a lower case c. See
Nelsen (1999) for an introduction to copulas.
15Epstein and Tanny (1980) interpret the condition in equation (29) as saying that C∗ exhibits greater correlation
than CI but we will refrain from using the term correlation unless referring directly to Pearsons linear correlation
or Spearmans rank correlation.
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To relate the above statistical ordering of dependence functions to some economic ordering,
Epstein and Tanny (1980) introduce the concept of correlation aversion. A utility function
involving two random variables is correlation averse if expected utility is reduced by a CIT. This
can be checked directly for utility functions that are twice diﬀerentiable by checking whether
∂2u (x, y)
∂x∂y
< 0 (30)
In this paper we consider the case that:
u (rit, rmt) = U (wirit +wmrmt) , where U is some utility function
∂2u (rit, rmt)
∂rit∂rmt
= U 00 (wirit + wmrmt)wiwm
≤ 0 if wi, wm ≥ 0
for any concave utility function U . We rule out short selling either the hedge fund or the market
portfolio, both reasonable restrictions for most investors, and so wi, wm ≥ 0. The weak inequality
above holds strictly if wiwm > 0; of course if either portfolio weight is zero then the investor is
correlation neutral. Thus any risk averse investor subject to short selling constraints will be
(weakly) correlation averse.
The concept of correlation aversion can be used to derive an economic ranking of dependence
functions for risk averse investors: if F1 and F2 are two possible joint distribution functions for
(rit, rmt) with common marginal distributions, and if
EF1 [u (rit, rmt)] ≤ EF2 [u (rit, rmt)] (31)
for all correlation averse utility functions u, then Epstein and Tanny (1980) write F2 4u F1 and
say that F1 is exhibits greater correlation than F2. The main theorem in Epstein and Tanny (1980)
shows that the ranking obtained from the expected utility of risk averse investors is equivalent to
the purely statistical concordance ordering discussed above. That is,
F2 4u F1 ⇔ F2 ≤ F1 (32)
In terms of dependence functions and neutrality, this implies that
CI 4u C∗ ⇔ CI ≤ C∗ (33)
and so any dependence function that is a CIT away from complete neutrality will be less preferred
by risk averse investors. Epstein and Tanny (1980) thus show theoretically that general risk averse
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investors care about the dependence (not just the correlation) between hedge fund returns and
market returns.
We could use the above results to motivate tests for a concordance ordering of hedge funds, using
tests for multivariate Þrst-order stochastic dominance. Instead we propose the more modest task
of examining the ordering of a scalar measure of dependence, namely Spearmans rank correlation.
Nelsen (1999) shows that Spearmans rank correlation will reßect the concordance ordering of two
dependence functions. That is,
C∗∗ ≤ C∗ ⇒ ρS (C∗∗) ≤ ρS (C∗) for any copulas C∗∗, C∗ (34)
and so we have
C∗∗ 4u CI 4u C∗ ⇔ C∗∗ ≤ CI ≤ C∗ ⇒ ρS (C∗∗) ≤ 0 ≤ ρS (C∗) (35)
Thus we may obtain an approximate ordering of the funds for a general risk averse investor by
categorizing the funds as having signiÞcant negative rank correlation, non-signiÞcant rank corre-
lation or signiÞcant positive rank correlation with the market index. Rank correlation can detect
monotonic nonlinear relationships, in addition to the linear relationships that the usual correlation
coeﬃcient may be used to detect.
Average rank correlation across the 171 funds with at least 18 observations was 0.016; a similar
Þgure to that obtained using linear correlation. From tests for non-zero rank correlation we found
26.3% of funds had signiÞcant rank correlation at the 0.05 level, and 25.1% of funds had signiÞcantly
positive rank correlation at the 0.05 level. Of course, complete neutrality implies neutrality of any
other type, and so all other tests in this paper may also be thought of as tests of necessary conditions
for complete neutrality.
3.6 Summary: are market neutral hedge funds really market neutral?
In this section we combine the results of the tests introduced above to draw an overall conclusion
about the market neutrality of funds with the label market neutral. Given that so few of the
funds in our sample had suﬃcient data for the test of tail neutrality to be applied, we will not
consider this test when drawing overall conclusions.
Declaring a fund to be non-neutral if it fails at least one test for market neutrality leads to
a size distortion. For example, the probability that a truly market neutral fund fails at least one
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of Þve independent tests of market neutrality, each with size 0.05, is 0.23. Further, we must take
into account the fact that the test statistics for each of the Þve tests considered here (correlation
neutrality, mean neutrality, variance neutrality, VaR neutrality and complete neutrality) are not
likely to be independent. We deal with these two problems by looking at the number of tests
failed by a set of bootstrapped data series, generated imposing the independence of the fund and
the market returns. If the actual number of tests failed is greater than the 95th percentile of the
number of tests failed by the bootstrapped data sets, then we conclude that the fund fails a joint
test of market neutrality. Further details are in the Appendix. The results obtained for market
neutral hedge funds are collected in the Þrst column of Table 4.
At the 0.05 level, we found that 28.1% of funds failed a joint test of market neutrality against
general non-neutral alternatives, while 21.6% of funds failed a joint test of market neutrality against
alternatives that are disliked by risk averse investors. The 95% critical value for the proportion of
funds failing a test of neutrality is 18.75%, and so both of these proportions represent signiÞcant
evidence against market neutrality for these funds as a whole.
A natural question to ask is how the neutral and non-neutral funds diﬀer along various dimen-
sions. In Table 3 we compare some simple summary statistics on two portfolios of these funds: the
Þrst (second) portfolio is constructed as an equally-weighted average of the neutral (non-neutral)
funds for each month in our sample. Table 3 reveals that the non-neutral portfolio yielded a sig-
niÞcantly greater average return than the neutral portfolio, and had signiÞcantly greater standard
deviation. The correlation with the market was signiÞcantly greater for the non-neutral portfolio
(a predictable outcome, given the way the two portfolios were constructed) and the average age of
non-neutral funds was signiÞcantly greater than neutral funds. The fact that non-neutral funds are,
on average, almost twice as old as neutral funds may either reßect the fact that more observations
lead to greater power to reject the null hypothesis of neutrality if it is false, or it may genuinely
reßect the fact that older funds tend to stray from market neutrality more than younger funds.
There was no signiÞcant diﬀerence in the average size of neutral and non-neutral funds.
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ]
In summary, we conclude that approximately one quarter of market neutral funds in our
sample exhibit signiÞcant deviations from market neutrality, of a type that is speciÞcally disliked
by risk averse investors. Our sample sizes are not extremely large (the median sample size is just
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42 observations) which means that the power of the tests employed may be low, suggesting that
the true proportion of non-neutral funds may be even higher. Our Þndings suggest that careful
analysis of fund returns is required to reap the widely-cited diversiÞcation beneÞts of hedge funds.
3.7 Are market neutral hedge funds more market neutral than other funds?
In this section we apply the tests introduced above to collections of hedge funds with other styles.
We look at four other hedge fund styles from the HFR data base: equity hedge, equity non-hedge,
event driven, and funds of funds. Equity hedge funds hold some exposure to the market, with
the degree of exposure ranging from near zero to over 100%, along with some hedge, either through
short sales of stocks or through stock options. Equity non-hedge funds are otherwise known as
stock pickers. These funds may also hedge their exposures, though generally not consistently.
Event driven funds seek returns from mergers, takeovers, bankruptcies, etc. These funds may or
may not hedge their exposures to the market. Funds of hedge funds invest in multiple funds, which
may or may not be in the same category.
Table 4 reports the results of tests for diﬀerent versions of neutrality on these four categories
of hedge funds, as well as on the market neutral hedge funds discussed above. This tables shows
that a far higher proportion of funds in the equity hedge, equity non-hedge, event driven, and
funds of hedge funds categories exhibit signiÞcant exposure to equity market risk. Over 80% of
equity non-hedge funds, for example, exhibit some signiÞcant violation of market neutrality at the
0.05 level, and over 88% of these funds have a signiÞcantly positive correlation coeﬃcient with
the market. The average correlation coeﬃcient across the 77 funds in this category with at least
18 observations is 0.51. The funds of funds category is the most market neutral of these four
categories, with about half of these funds exhibiting some signiÞcant violation of market neutrality.
The average correlation coeﬃcient across the 457 funds in this category with at least 18 observations
was 0.25.
Recalling that only 25% of market neutral funds exhibited signiÞcant violations of market
neutrality, and that the average correlation coeﬃcient across funds was 0.016, we draw the conclu-
sion that while not all market neutral funds are truly market neutral, they are, as a category,
substantially more market neutral than other hedge fund categories.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ]
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4 Robustness checks
In this section we conduct robustness checks of the results reported above. Firstly, we consider an
alternative index for the market portfolio, the MSCI World index. We then consider changing
the outlook of our hypothetical investor from one who cares about U.S. dollar returns to one who
cares about British pound returns. We then analyze whether our results change when we drop the
last six months, or the Þrst 12 months, of available data on Þrms, and Þnally we look at the relation
between the number of observations available on a fund and its dependence characteristics.
Choice of market portfolio. Obviously the choice of market index is an important input
to tests of market neutrality. In the paper we considered using the S&P 500 index as the market
index, and a summary of results for this case are presented in the Þrst column of Table 5. Corre-
sponding results when the MSCI World index is instead used are presented in the second column
of Table 5. Comparing these two columns shows that our results are robust to this choice. We
also obtained results (not reported) when the MSCI Europe index was employed and again no
substantial diﬀerences were found.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ]
Choice of currency. To consider the impact of our choice to examine the neutrality of these
hedge funds from the perspective of a U.S. investor, we re-computed all results from the perspective
of a U.K. investor. The results for a U.K. investor using the MSCI World index are presented in
the third column of Table 5. The diﬀerences in the results are small: the proportion of rejected
funds falls from roughly one-quarter to one-Þfth, but remains signiÞcant.
End-game behavior. In the months leading up to a fund dropping out of the HFR or TASS
databases it is conceivable that the behavior of a funds returns changes. If a fund is doing poorly
and is about to be liquidated then the investment decisions of the hedge fund manager may place
greater emphasis on objectives other than maintaining the market neutrality of the fund. For this
reason, we re-computed all the results for the U.S. based investor using the S&P 500 index as the
market index, dropping the last six observations on each fund. The results are presented in the
fourth column of Table 5, and are not substantially diﬀerent from the results for the benchmark
case.
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BackÞll bias. Hedge funds usually enter databases with a history of returns, usually ranging
from 6 to 18 months in length. It might be reasonable to think that the emphasis placed on
maintaining market neutrality during the Þrst year of a funds life, relative to simply achieving
positive returns, is lower than for the rest of a market neutral funds life. Thus a rejection
of market neutrality may come from the funds Þrst year of life, and not be representative of its
neutrality following that Þrst year. To allow for this we re-computed all the results for the U.S.
based investor using the S&P 500 index as the market index, dropping the Þrst twelve observations
on each fund. The results are presented in the last column of Table 5 and are not substantially
diﬀerent from the results for the benchmark case.
Age of the fund and its market neutrality. Above we reported proportions of rejections of
market neutrality concepts, averaging across all funds with suﬃcient data to conduct the test. But
an interesting, and possibly important, question is whether the older funds have diﬀerent market
dependence properties to newer funds. As an example, in Figure 1 we plot the linear correlation
between a fund and the S&P 500 market index against the number of observations available on
that fund. This plot indicates a signiÞcant positive relation between the correlation coeﬃcient and
the age of the fund16. The robust t-statistics associated with each of these correlation coeﬃcients
also have a positive relation with the number of observations available. Further, a probit regression
(not reported) of the probability of a t-statistic being greater than 1.96 revealed a positive and
signiÞcant dependence on the number of observations available. A similar picture emerged when
comparing the average age of funds that passed and failed the joint test of market neutrality on
the downside, presented in Table 3.
These Þndings suggest that market neutral hedge funds that survive for a relatively long time
are more positively dependent on the market return than younger funds. This may be related to
the fact that many hedge fund prospectuses commit the fund to a market neutral strategy only
for a Þxed period of time (three years seems to be a common choice), if at all. Material changes
of investment strategy within that time often require the approval of shareholders, but changes
after that time are not discussed. It is thus possible that hedge funds exhibit style drift, and
that funds that were once correctly classiÞed as market neutral may not follow such strategies
16The reader may notice two observations in the upper right-hand corner of this plot, representing two funds that
have the maximum number of observations (121) and correlation coeﬃcients of over 0.9. We re-did the regression
without these observations and the relation was still signiÞcantly positive.
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any more. This observation suggests that a classiÞcation method based on relating fund returns to
various risk factors, as in Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Fung and Hsieh (1997) for example,
may be more reliable than one based on the self-reported styles of funds.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
5 Extensions
In this section we discuss the issues surrounding two of the more important extensions of the
deÞnitions and tests presented in Section 3. A full treatment of these and other extensions is being
pursued in separate work.
5.1 Time-varying market neutrality
That hedge fund managers employ dynamic trading strategies is widely known, and thus one may
ask whether conducting tests on unconditional correlation coeﬃcients or market betas, for example,
is less interesting than studying the conditional correlations or betas between the return on a fund
and the return on the market index. In this section we propose extending (unconditional) beta
(or correlation) neutrality to conditional beta neutrality. We leave the consideration of time
variation in the other forms of neutrality proposed in this paper for future work.
Consider the following simple time-varying beta model, in the spirit of Harvey (1989) and
Shanken (1990):
rit = α+ βtrmt + eit (36)
βt = γ0 + γ1r¯it,6 + γ2r¯mt,6 + γ3r¯
2
mt,6
where r¯it,6 ≡
P6
j=1 ri,t−j , r¯mt,6 ≡
P6
j=1 rm,t−j , r¯
2
mt,6 ≡
P6
j=1 r
2
m,t−j . This model is designed to
capture the possibility that market neutral hedge fund managers may dynamically adjust their
exposure to the market according to the past performance of their fund, the past performance
of the market, and the recent volatility of the market. We did not conduct an extensive search
of the possible determinants of the conditional betas of these hedge funds; these three variables
seemed reasonable variables to use in this initial investigation. Correlation neutrality, as deÞned in
Section 2, is tested by estimating γ0, under the restriction that γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0, and then testing
23
that γ0 = 0. But it is conceivable that a fund may have a zero beta on average, but a non-zero
suﬃcient condition for market neutrality to the wider array of market risks. Greater power may
be obtained by constructing tests of neutrality to multiple sources of market risk.
All of the tests proposed in this paper generalize quite straightforwardly to consider multiple
sources of market risk. However the limited amount of hedge fund returns data available may mean
that the most obvious extensions, where the additional market risks are simply added as additional
explanatory variables, will actually lead to a loss of power rather than a gain; increased estimation
error may dominate the increased information from the additional risk sources. One alternative is
to combine the sources of risk into a single index or portfolio, and then test for neutrality against
this portfolio of market risks. For example, to allow both contemporaneous and lagged market
returns to aﬀect the hedge fund return, we could use the following simple index:
rmt ≡ 0.4rmt + 0.3rmt−1 + 0.2rmt−2 + 0.1rmt−3 (38)
Using rmt rather than rmt as the market index allows lagged returns to aﬀect hedge fund risk, as
suggested by Asness, et al. (2001) and Getmansky, et al. (2003), without increasing the number
of parameters that need to be estimated. The above choice of weights is arbitrary, but reßects the
spirit of these two papers, and is roughly in accordance with the median values, across funds, of
the regression coeﬃcients obtained from regressing the fund return on a constant, and lags zero
through three of the market return17. When we applied the tests of the previous sections using
this weighted average of lagged market returns as the market index we found results quite similar
to those obtained just using the contemporaneous value of the market return, see Table 6. This
suggests that lagged market returns do impact these hedge fund returns: if lagged market returns
were unrelated to hedge fund returns then the rmt variable would simply be a noisier measure of
market risk, and the proportion of rejections would fall. It may be possible to construct alternative
combinations of current and lagged market returns that lead to a greater proportion of rejections,
keeping in mind the strict trade-oﬀ between ßexibility and parsimony, but we leave this for future
work.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ]
17The median values of these four coeﬃcients, across funds, were 0.51, 0.20, 0.14, 0.15, when the coeﬃcients were
normalised to sum to one.
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